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Hospitals, Finance, and Health System 
Reform in Britain and the United States, 
c. 1910 – 1950: Historical Revisionism and 
Cross- National Comparison
Martin Gorsky
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Abstract Comparative histories of health system development have been vari-
ously influenced by the theoretical approaches of historical institutionalism, politi-
cal pluralism, and labor mobilization. Britain and the United States have figured 
significantly in this literature due to their very different trajectories. This article 
explores the implications of recent research on hospital history in the two countries 
for existing historiographies, particularly the coming of the National Health Service 
in Britain. It argues that the two hospital systems initially developed in broadly 
similar ways, despite the very different outcomes in the 1940s. Thus, applying 
the conceptual tools used to explain the U.S. trajectory can deepen appreciation 
of events in Britain. Attention focuses particularly on working- class hospital con-
tributory schemes and their implications for finance, governance, and participation; 
these are then compared with Blue Cross and U.S. hospital prepayment. While 
acknowledging the importance of path dependence in shaping attitudes of British 
bureaucrats toward these schemes, analysis emphasizes their failure in pressure 
group politics, in contrast to the United States. In both countries labor was also cru-
cial, in the United States sustaining employment- based prepayment and in Britain 
broadly supporting system reform.
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Introduction:  
Comparison in Health Systems History
The comparative history of health systems is now a substantial field, both 
in its own right and within the literature on welfare states. Britain and 
the United States have figured frequently in such histories, thanks to per-
ceptions of them as “polar types,” the former with its early move to a 
centralized National Health Service (NHS) and the latter with its long-
standing adherence to public- private welfare structures (Anderson 1963: 
842). The two countries’ experiences have also been influential in shaping 
theoretical explanations of health system development. Put crudely, such 
approaches have moved on from an early focus on welfare policies as 
concomitants of industrial development or products of national political 
cultures. Instead scholarship over the last three decades has tended toward 
three strands of interpretation. Some have concentrated on the social 
forces that advance redistributive welfare reform, emphasizing either 
the agency of the organized working class or the decisive importance of 
cross- class solidarities. Others, thinking within a framework of political 
pluralism, have foregrounded the role of interest groups in determining 
the timing and extent of reform, with the medical profession typically the 
key actor. A third strand has privileged the nature of the state, emphasiz-
ing the role of bureaucracy as progenitor of change and the part played by 
institutional structures in advancing or impeding legislative development. 
Within this historical institutionalist school the concept of path depen-
dence has gained particular traction, illuminating different national out-
comes by showing how early decisions conditioned later trajectories. 
These, then, are the main planks of interpretation with which new 
national or comparative research must engage. My aim here is to discuss 
the implications for such accounts of recent revisionist work on British 
and American health services in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Specifically, I focus on the financing and organization of hospital care 
in an era when both countries moved from traditional modes of philan-
thropy to new forms of organized prepayment. In Britain the period before 
the inception of the NHS had seen the introduction of statutory national 
health insurance (NHI) through which primary care was made available 
to employed workers. Hospital coverage, however, was excluded, and the 
response was the emergence of voluntary contributory schemes to pro-
vide access to the voluntary hospitals, the main sites of acute care. In the 
United States, meanwhile, legislators had decisively rejected European- 
style health insurance. An alternative route of private, employment- based 
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insurance had developed to provide income replacement during sickness, 
but in the interwar period this proved insufficient for hospital care. The 
U.S. solution was a different form of prepayment, notably Blue Cross. 
Hitherto the similarities between these British and American funding 
models have gone largely unobserved, the national paths having appar-
ently already diverged. Yet consideration of their parallel histories directs 
attention to common experiences. Their hospitals were tackling the chal-
lenges of broadening access and consolidating their financial base as med-
ical technologies advanced. Both funding mechanisms had ramifications 
for hospital capacity and managerial control and for the regionalization 
of health systems. Both were responses by the private and voluntary sec-
tors to earlier policy decisions to keep the state out of hospital insurance, 
setting a path creating new stakeholder interests that would shape sub-
sequent debates. Both represented a means of providing health coverage 
for employed workers and hence are germane to discussion of labor’s part 
in health system change. Yet both experienced different outcomes follow-
ing the mid- century health care debates, with the U.S. prepayment funds 
retaining independence and the British contributory schemes losing their 
prime function to the NHS. Consideration of why this was so should there-
fore augment our understanding of this crucial phase of health politics.
Two preliminary points need to be made. First, this study does not pro-
pose a fundamental revision to the historical explanation of such changes, 
whose causes in both countries are multifaceted. Instead it asks how new 
research into hitherto underexplored aspects fits with existing theoretical 
accounts and, where it proves incompatible, what this suggests for read-
ings of the politics of health reform. One place it leads is to a skeptical 
position toward any single “master explanation,” whether treating interest 
group pressures as the primary factor, class and organized labor as the 
critical determinant, or the structural bias of institutions as crucial (Quad-
agno 2005: 11; Navarro 1989: 890; Steinmo and Watts 1995: 330). My 
case instead suggests that integrating insights from all three interpretative 
schools yields the most satisfying results. 
Second, the primary research from which this article arose has been on 
the British side alone. It was animated originally by the aim of reevaluat-
ing earlier accounts of the voluntary hospitals and their role in the coming 
of the NHS. I subsequently developed the American comparison based 
on the secondary literature, both because the cross- national similarities 
noted above seemed worth exploring and because comparative approaches 
offered a means of averting “explanatory provincialism” and of gauging 
which causal factors were “decisive, as opposed to simply present” (Mar-
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mor, Freeman, and Okma 2005: 339). My method here is therefore one of 
“confronting” two historiographies “with one another,” then identifying 
similarities and differences to prompt novel perspectives and questions 
(Hennock 2007: 4 – 5). 
I begin with a brief outline of British and American health politics 
in the early to mid- twentieth century, then examine how these cases are 
treated by different analytical schools in cross- national comparison. I next 
introduce some of the recent literature on British and U.S. hospitals and 
health insurance during the interwar period and discuss its significance 
for the existing historiography. The central sections turn to the rise of the 
British contributory schemes and their role in hospital finance and orga-
nization. I compare this with hospital prepayment in the United States, 
particularly Blue Cross, where I argue that notwithstanding the different 
paths on which the two countries were set, some key similarities remained 
until the mid- 1940s. Turning finally to the NHS debates, I draw on com-
parative analysis to examine anew the point at which the British path 
irrevocably diverged.
Trends in National and Cross- National 
Historiographies
Overview
Two periods of reform loom large in histories of health policy in Brit-
ain and United States: the 1910s, when the British government adopted 
a national health insurance (NHI) system and various American states 
rejected this option, and the late 1930s and 1940s, when Britain created 
its NHS and the United States again refused NHI. Before the 1910s health 
services in both countries were a mixed economy. Civil society organiza-
tions provided sickness insurance: the friendly societies in Britain and 
fraternities and industrial funds in the United States. Hospital provision 
spanned a public sector, which included mental asylums and poor law 
institutions (fewer in the United States), private proprietary hospitals 
(fewer in Britain), and acute care voluntary hospitals (Gosden 1961; Mur-
ray 2007; Peebles 1929: 9, 12; Pinker 1966: 49; Abel- Smith 1964; Rosen-
berg 1987; Jacobs 1992: 188). Policy debate followed the 1883 enactment 
of statutory sickness insurance in Bismarck’s Germany, which built on 
the work of existing sick funds (Hennock 2007). As its viability became 
established other countries followed, with Britain’s Liberal government 
initiating NHI in 1911 as part of a broader social program. It covered 
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specific categories of worker, with funding from employers, employees, 
and the state, to provide a sickness benefit and medical care, though not 
in hospitals; existing friendly societies and private insurers were the car-
riers (Harris 2004: 211 – 213). Gradually the population coverage of NHI 
extended, and many doctors combined insurance “panel” work with fee- 
paying private patients (Digby 1999). Meanwhile in the United States, 
Progressive reformers campaigned for the adoption of mandatory health 
insurance, but state legislatures rejected their proposals, as did a referen-
dum held in California (Starr 1982; Hoffman 2001). 
In both countries a new momentum for reform gathered from the 1930s, 
underpinned by concerns about service organization, finance, and popula-
tion coverage. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided against 
including health insurance within New Deal Social Security legislation, 
a series of attempts was made (generically, the Wagner- Murray- Dingell 
health bill) between 1939 and 1949 to legislate for NHI. None were car-
ried, despite gaining presidential backing from Harry S. Truman in 1945, 
although federal aid for hospital construction was endorsed in the Hill- 
Burton Act of 1946. World War II and the reconstruction plans in the 
Beveridge Report catalyzed British interest in a comprehensive, univer-
sal, and free health service. The wartime coalition government initially 
proposed that this might be funded from a mix of NHI and general and 
local taxation (Beveridge 1942: 6, 160 – 161; Ministry of Health 1944). 
A lengthy phase of policy debate ensued, until the Labour Party won the 
1945 election and the new minister of health, Aneurin Bevan, brought 
forward a bill. This unified the hospital service by bringing both vol-
untary and municipal institutions under central state ownership, funded 
principally through national taxation. Democratic accountability would 
be achieved through ministerial responsibility to Parliament. On this basis 
the NHS Acts for England and Wales (1946) and Scotland (1947) were 
passed, and the service was launched on the “appointed day,” July 5, 1948 
(Klein 2006: 12 – 22; Webster 2002: 10 – 30). 
Explanatory Approaches
Those are some basic facts of the two national histories. How are they 
accounted for in the broader comparative literature on welfare states and 
on health systems within them? Here I briefly sketch the current lead-
ing schools of thought and suggest how these have been applied to the 
British and American cases. Such a strategy inevitably oversimplifies: to 
allot particular explanatory models to given authors is not to imply dog-
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matic theoretical attachment; typically it is a matter of emphasis within 
multilayered accounts. I also do not dwell on earlier theorists who have 
asked whether the development of welfare states is best understood as a 
“logic of industrialism” or a product of democratization, or as culturally 
determined (whether by national values or intellectual currents) (Skocpol 
and Amenta 1986: 131; Polanyi [1944] 2001: 152 – 162; Wilensky 1975; 
Ashford 1986). Each approach has its insights, but each has come to seem 
less compelling in the comparative historiography than accounts that in 
their various ways put “the state back in” (Skocpol 1985).
Writers with a Marxist perspective who treat the state as an arena 
of class struggle offer two broadly complementary readings. The first 
emphasizes the use of welfare to mediate social tensions by incorporating 
the newly enfranchised working class and legitimizing the existing order 
(Habermas 1996: 297 – 299). Otto von Bismarck’s notorious statement that 
social insurance offered a complementary strategy to his government’s 
simultaneous “repression of social- democratic excesses” is a classic ref-
erence point (Bauriedl 1981: 403). This, though, is to deemphasize the 
agency of labor itself and perhaps to mistake rhetorical gestures deployed 
to garner support for evidence of prime motivation, as has been argued 
in revisionist analyses of Bismarck (Hennock 2007: 94 – 96, 159). Others 
are therefore inclined to see social programs as the more direct outcome 
of labor politics, with the strength of trade unions and the formation of 
social democratic parties the crucial determinants (Korpi 1983; Elling 
1994; Navarro 1989). Britain and the United States apparently conform 
well to this labor mobilization thesis. The rise of the Labour Party in the 
Edwardian period can be read as a pressing incentive for British Liber-
als to adopt policies that countered its appeal. Meanwhile, in the United 
States, with a labor movement fractured by regionalism and ethnicity and 
lacking a socialist party to rally “untapped class sentiment,” the Progres-
sives’ NHI proposals lacked political support (Oestreicher 1988: 1278). A 
frequently cited illustration of labor’s insularity is the rejection of NHI by 
Samuel Gompers, the leader of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), 
because it undermined the sectional appeal of the trade union benefits. 
Perhaps, though, this attributes too much to labor? In Britain, as elsewhere 
in Europe, socialists did not conceive NHI, and the unions came only later 
to full support of state health care.
Some therefore find it more compelling to view the state as a site of plu-
ralist negotiation in which political decisions are the outcomes of bargain-
ing between different economic and sectional interest groups, of which 
labor was only one (Eckstein 1964). Deep social reform was carried only 
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when solidarities between groups that stood to gain outweighed the influ-
ence of those that did not (Baldwin 1990). Key oppositional actors in 
debates about health care were business, balancing productivist concerns 
with the cost implications of mandatory financing systems, and the insur-
ance industries, calculating the commercial impact of state incursions into 
life and sickness coverage. Above all, it was organized medicine that could 
shape outcomes (Wilsford 1991; Dutton 2007). The obstructive power of 
the American Medical Association (AMA) has been a recurrent theme in 
the “why no NHI in the USA?” literature (Starr 1982: 286 – 289; Quad-
agno 2005). After initial ambivalence the AMA repeatedly marshaled its 
political and economic clout to block reform proposals. Meanwhile, in 
Britain the opposition of the British Medical Association (BMA) to NHI 
was compromised because some members saw economic advantage in the 
scheme, as long as generous remuneration was negotiated. Later its hostil-
ity to local government irrevocably shaped the NHS as a service based on 
regionalism and one in which private medicine survived. 
However, pluralist negotiation alone does not adequately explain dif-
fering outcomes. After all, medical corporations everywhere have sought 
to defend the clinical and financial freedoms of the doctor- patient rela-
tionship and everywhere have exercised peculiar leverage thanks to the 
“mysteries” of the trade. Even allowing for the dissent of poorer or pro-
gressive doctors, it is puzzling that in some places the pressure group veto 
was exercised more successfully than in others. An alternative explanation 
may therefore lie with the autonomous nature of national political institu-
tions in facilitating or impeding change. 
Historical institutionalism has two key planks. One is to emphasize the 
agency of the administration itself, with the growth and capacity of the 
bureaucracy a key determinant of the successful development and enact-
ment of policy (Ashford 1986; Davidson and Lowe 1981; Weir, Orloff, 
and Skocpol 1988). Thus quite distant phases of state formation could be 
significant. For example, in Britain the mid- Victorian professionalization 
of the civil service and the later consensus around a broadly equitable tax 
system meant that as democracy was extended citizens broadly trusted the 
agencies of the state (Daunton 1996). In the United States, by contrast, the 
persistence of patronage and spoils through the early era of mass politics 
ingrained skepticism toward federal action. This explains, for example, 
why the Civil War veterans’ pensions scheme proved to be a time- limited 
program and not the foundation for a more extensive welfare state (Orloff 
1988). 
The other plank is the polity itself — the structures of the state and 
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lawmaking processes — and how these shape outcomes (Immergut 1992). 
From this perspective, the British parliamentary system proved condu-
cive to health care reform because its “first past the post” electoral sys-
tem typically delivered power to a single party, often with a comfort-
able majority on which a cabinet government (which initiated almost all 
legislation) could depend. The traditionally strong party whip, coupled 
with a fairly streamlined lawmaking process, left opponents with few 
veto points at which they might intercede. In the United States, however, 
electoral endorsement and presidential support could be confounded by 
the lawmaking process: the separation of powers meant legislation could 
be proposed from different quarters, and even when agreed to, a com-
plex committee process provided multiple stages at which a bill could be 
blocked (Steinmo and Watts 1995: 343 – 345). The Democratic Party (the 
initiator of NHI bills) was a coalition of diverse regional and ethnic inter-
ests in which the party whip was weak and congressional members (once 
Dixiecrats, later Blue Dogs) could bend before pressure politics, perhaps 
including considerations of local party financing. Thus the AMA wielded 
more clout than the BMA despite their broadly similar standpoints.
Finally, history matters in historical institutionalism. The sequence 
in which legislation occurred, or did not occur, determined possibilities 
for future action — feedback loops — both by reshaping institutions and 
agents central to the policy process and by recalibrating the costs and 
benefits attached to subsequent changes (Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988: 
16 – 17; Hacker 1998). Consider the early phase of NHI in Britain: once 
the BMA had partially surrendered its autonomy in 1911 without cata-
strophic results, and once NHI had proven itself popular and viable, the 
scope widened for further reforms (Hacker 1998: 90 – 92). Meanwhile, 
early failures in the United States embedded labor’s pessimism about the 
political route (Stevens 1988: 135). The concept of increasing returns, 
borrowed from path dependence economics, is also helpful in drawing 
attention to how early investment in one system drastically limits the pos-
sibilities of adopting another. Thus the U.S. rejection of NHI in the 1910s 
spurred myriad private and voluntary arrangements that both undermined 
later needs- based arguments for NHI and created new interest groups hos-
tile to further reform (Stevens 1988; Klein 2003). Conversely, Britain’s 
commitment in 1948 to a single- payer, tax- funded system made prohibi-
tive the costs of later conversion to insurance- based arrangements, despite 
changing preferences (Lowe 2006). 
In sum, then, the tools of political science have furnished an explana-
tion for the development of the British health system that seems cred-
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ible in cross- national perspective. Jacob Hacker’s (1998) reading, which 
draws heavily on the work of Rudolf Klein and Harry Eckstein, helpfully 
illustrates this with its synthesis of relevant cultural and pluralist perspec-
tives within a context of historical institutionalism. For both countries, 
the 1910s were the critical juncture that determined their future courses. 
In the United States NHI failed thanks to industry and AMA opposi-
tion and labor’s divisions, paving the way for private- sector arrangements 
to emerge. In Britain it succeeded, ultimately not because of prevail-
ing political values or the challenge of Labour, important as these were, 
but because the polity permitted lawmakers to override interest group 
positions. Thus while American reformers now confronted the feedback 
effects of a burgeoning private sector sustaining AMA confidence, and 
institutional structures riddled with veto points to be exploited by pressure 
groups, prospects for deeper change in Britain were bright. 
Indeed, once established in Britain, NHI developed an “expansionary 
political dynamic” that reached its “almost inexorable” culmination in a 
universal tax- funded service (Hacker 1998: 65, 82, 87). Here, with medi-
cine’s guild power diminished and oppositional arguments neutralized, 
a broad consensus in favor of further reform developed, encompassing 
civil servants, politicians, and doctors. This reflected the strengthening 
administrative capacity and “policy learning” by health bureaucrats, but 
it also represented the medical profession’s interest. Not only did doctors 
seek a more secure funding base for the voluntary hospitals, they also 
wanted a more rational organization of local services that integrated the 
new expertise grounded in laboratory science with hospital care and the 
primary interface — in Fox’s words, “hierarchical regionalism” (Eckstein 
1964; Klein 2006: chap. 1; Fox 1986). Public opinion, already softened 
toward state health care by NHI, improvements in poor law medicine, 
and weariness with charitable hospital appeals, also fell into line (Jacobs 
1992). Thus further reform premised on extended coverage and hierarchi-
cal regionalism was probable thanks to the logic set in motion by NHI, 
although it took a further critical juncture, Labour’s 1945 electoral victory, 
to carry the NHS package (Hacker 1998: 93 – 95; Fox 1986: 132 – 133). 
Competing Arguments: Britain
Two trends in the recent history of British health services potentially sit 
uneasily with this. First, scholars have disputed the degree of interwar 
consensus, noting instead the highly contested nature of regional plan-
ning and the apathy or downright opposition of elements of the medical 
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profession (Webster 1990). This in turn has reinvigorated the argument 
about working- class mobilization, with studies of socialist medical activ-
ism restoring the place of political ideology (Stewart 1997, 1999). The 
Labour Party’s role in local government has also been explored and con-
nections drawn between commitment to municipal socialism and invest-
ment in particular public health services (Powell 1995; Willis 2001). Such 
work highlights anew the ideas of the organized left and Bevan’s socialist 
values in influencing the civil servants who planned the NHS (Webster 
1990, 1998). The emphasis has returned to conflict, not “conflict within 
consensus,” and the final outcome in 1946 – 1947 now seems more contin-
gent and less assured. 
Second, a plethora of studies have been undertaken on the voluntary 
hospitals, testing, challenging, and developing the claims advanced in 
earlier texts. A new picture of financing has emerged, problematizing a 
cornerstone of the consensus argument, which asserts that a crisis of hos-
pital budgets due to philanthropic inadequacy made state funding the only 
viable option (cf. Klein 2006: 3; Fox 1986: 133). Instead the new hospital 
history has documented vigorous growth of third- sector hospital contribu-
tory schemes, which by the 1930s substantially filled the income gap cre-
ated when expenditure demands outflanked charitable support (Cherry 
1992, 1997; Gorsky, Mohan, and Powell 2002a). Mass scheme member-
ship also facilitated working- class access to hospital governing bodies 
and a community role in local policy making (Cherry 1996; Thompson 
2003). Studies of public opinion have complicated the picture further, 
showing that although there certainly was strong dissatisfaction with 
the working of NHI, disapproval of the voluntary hospitals and support 
for nationalization was less firm than previously thought (Hayes forth-
coming; cf. Harris 1983; Jacobs 1992). Labor’s position has also become 
less clear- cut. In some places, depending on industrial structure and local 
class politics, accommodation with the voluntary sector seemed preferable 
to public ownership (Doyle 2010). This history also lends weight to Fox’s 
hierarchical regionalism case, because some contributory schemes were 
integral elements of pan- urban hospital councils, rationalizing funding 
and provision across a range of public and voluntary institutions (Cherry 
1992; Sturdy 1992; Gorsky, Mohan, and Willis 2007). If such planning 
mechanisms within a mixed economy were indeed emerging at the grass-
roots level, it makes the outcome of state hospital provision under the 
NHS seem rather less inexorable. 
It should be stressed that this literature does not speak with a unified 
voice on the nature of working- class mobilization, the financial health 
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of the voluntary hospitals, or the viability of regional integration. How-
ever, the new hospital history and the recovery of the mass contributory 
schemes, including the role of labor within them, clearly pose a challenge 
to the existing historiography. Earlier authors, if they noticed the schemes 
at all, treated them as bit players — for example, Fox barely referred to 
them and neglected their role within regional bodies, while Lawrence 
Jacobs overlooked them in the context of public opinion about voluntary 
hospital ownership and funding (Fox 1986: 55; Jacobs 1992: 200 – 203; cf. 
Hacker 1998: 95). Abel- Smith’s classic account dismissed their role in the 
policy process thus: “The pre- payment agencies . . . were unbusinesslike, 
ineffectively co- ordinated and run by persons without power or influence. 
They were swept into the background without antagonizing any important 
section of opinion” (1964: 499). This judgment now looks too cursory. 
Here was an organizational form whose membership extended to some 
10 million people and that might have become a component of the NHS 
(Dodd 1957). Indeed, Beveridge had considered a hospital service funded 
by contributory schemes, and civil servants actively explored the possibil-
ity in 1942 – 1943 (Beveridge 1942: 158 – 160; Honigsbaum 1989). Thus 
early plans for the NHS assumed their incorporation, and the retention of 
an independent hospital sector backed by voluntary prepayment remained 
a possible outcome. Only when the decision was made in late 1943 (well 
before the Labour victory) to abandon the contributory schemes in favor 
of public funding was the way opened for hospital nationalization. Again, 
this suggests contingency and uncertainty rather than a smooth passage 
from NHI to NHS.
Competing Arguments: United States 
In the United States, revisionism over the last two decades has interrogated 
dominant assumptions about how the United States’ private, employment- 
based health insurance system came about. One piece of conventional 
wisdom now under assault is that voluntary sickness insurance in the Pro-
gressive era was negligible because industrial plans were financially weak 
and fraternities primarily interested in conviviality (Murray 2007; Emery 
2010; Beito 2000; cf. Schwartz 1965: 452). New work has revealed exten-
sive, attractively priced, and financially robust arrangements for sickness 
coverage, and this informs the contention that Americans rejected NHI 
in the 1910s principally because they did not want it. The claim is that 
because real wages in the United States were substantially higher than in 
Europe, blue- collar workers were more able to purchase their own medical 
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care as they saw fit; hence insurance for a cash benefit remained prefer-
able to a Bismarck- style scheme (Costa 1995; Murray 2007; Emery 2010). 
Institutional structures and pressure politics were therefore less relevant, 
given labor’s satisfaction with the status quo.
This argument does not extend beyond the Progressive period, how-
ever, for the rising costs and effectiveness of medicine gradually shifted 
the imperative from wage replacement to service benefits (Thomasson 
2003). Research therefore centers on the timing and causes of the takeoff 
of employment- based health insurance, a problem also salient to contem-
porary policy debates about consumer- driven health care. Some com-
mentators trace present inadequacies to government intervention during 
wartime, which they suggest first oriented coverage toward workplace 
group health insurance rather than the purportedly more efficient indi-
vidual coverage (Jost 2007: 54 – 55; Cannon and Tanner 2005: 67 – 68; 
Gabel 1999: 63). It is certainly true that wartime public policies did make 
group schemes attractive to employers and employees. Wage controls were 
introduced in 1942, following Roosevelt’s desire to stabilize labor rela-
tions and curb inflation. Then in 1943 came the exemption from the wage 
freeze of fringe benefits, including employee insurance plans (Thomasson 
2002; Dobbin 1992: 1436 – 1437). However, these policies came too late 
to account for the early growth, which dates instead from the Depression 
(Jost 2007: 53 – 61). Indeed, analysis of benefits offered by U.S. industries 
suggests that by 1939 health and accident insurance was already prevalent 
in 38 percent of large businesses and in 26 percent of smaller firms (Dob-
bin 1992: 1421 – 1424). Attention has therefore moved to the1930s, though 
opinion is divided on which factors were crucial. 
Some analyses point to earlier aspects of public policy. Although Blue 
Cross hospital prepayment schemes first emerged as civil society orga-
nizations, their growth was fostered by state legislatures, which granted 
them nonprofit status that conferred exemptions from taxation and reserve 
requirements (Thomasson 2002). The unintended consequence was to 
create space in the market for private providers. To maintain status as 
public benefit organizations, Blue Cross schemes were tied to the principle 
of community rating (a standard premium set regardless of the health 
status of the insured person on joining). Private insurers could gain a 
competitive advantage by offering employers a cheaper contract through 
experience rating (differential pricing that privileged younger, healthier 
groups). Thus once Blue Cross had demonstrated the viability of hospital 
prepayment, the legal framework encouraged the insurance industry to 
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promote competing products to employers (Jost 2007: 57 – 58; Klein 2003: 
208 – 212). 
Researchers have also focused on how the repeated rejections of NHI 
reshaped the attitudes of labor and capital toward private health insur-
ance. One approach is simply to treat labor unions as vehicles through 
which rising individual demand was expressed and to see preferences for 
employment- based coverage as a rational response to price signals: group 
insurance was comparatively cheap (Thomasson 2003). An alternative 
earlier reading was that insurance provision was a deliberate industrial 
strategy adopted by employers to retain employees in a competitive labor 
market. However, this idea now looks untenable because early take- up 
was in industries associated less with tight labor markets than with active 
unionization (Dobbin 1992: 1430). The context was the emergence of new 
industrial unions and a rapid rise in membership from about 3.6 million 
in 1930 to 7.28 million in 1940, accompanied by increasingly frequent 
and effective strikes, particularly to secure union recognition (Gordon, 
Edwards, and Reich 1982: 177). Insurance benefits could both “appease 
unions” and “subvert . . . organizing efforts,” albeit with minimal costs to 
business as they were predominantly employee financed before the 1950s 
(Dobbin 1992: 1442; Gordon 2003: 56 – 57). But labor was not entirely 
reactive, and the progressive politics of the New Deal encouraged unions 
to support universal health benefits delivered through NHI and public 
health programs and to initiate novel local services (Derickson 2005: 
73 – 87; Klein 2003: 117 – 118, 149 – 160). In this reading it was only with 
conservative victories in the 1946 congressional elections that labor finally 
committed to the strategy of achieving health security through negotia-
tions for fringe benefits. Ultimately labor was forced into accommodation 
with the “resurgent welfare capitalism” imposed by employers (Derickson 
2005: 110 – 111). 
Once again this is not a literature that speaks with a single voice. On 
one side are econometricians who regard the very question “Why is there 
no NHI in the United States?” as misguided historicism (Murray 2007: 
237 – 247; cf. Fox 1983). On the other are political historians who seek 
to move beyond the institutional analysis and place at center stage the 
shifting power relationships between the key economic actors: employers 
and labor unions (Klein 2003: 9 – 10; Gordon 2003: 6 – 9). Their goal is 
to integrate insights about state agency with pluralist and labor mobiliza-
tion approaches to derive a multicausal account of how social policy was 
shaped (Gordon 2003: 9; Dobbin 1992). I argue below that this strategy 
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of analyzing the “balance of power in the political economy” within an 
institutionalist framework also provides a helpful way of thinking about 
the British case (Klein 2003: 9). But first I bring the historical develop-
ment of the two systems into view. 
Hospital Systems and Financing  
in Britain and the United States,  
Nineteenth Century to c. 1950
By the start of the twentieth century both countries had developed two- 
tier hospital systems, reflecting shared assumptions about the proper roles 
of public and voluntary sectors. The former provided institutions of last 
resort for the dependent poor, and the latter catered to the self- supporting 
population (Boychuk 1999: viii, 9 – 13, 156). Although accessible and 
affordable, public care was tarnished by the Poor Law stigma attached 
to the Victorian workhouse (almshouse in the United States). It was also 
obliged to meet demands of chronic illness and social care and was com-
paratively poorly resourced (Brundage 2002; Crowther 1981; Katz 1996: 
13 – 15, 30 – 31). The voluntary hospitals, with their ability to select admis-
sions and their superior levels of funding, led the field of acute care and 
scientific medicine. In Britain these had proliferated since the eighteenth 
century, predominantly as middle- class subscriber charities, often ori-
ented to the early industrial workforce and consolidating ties of deference 
and patronage at a time of rapid urban change (Fissell 1991; Marland 
1987: 117 – 145). Doctors exploited the kudos of unpaid consultant posts to 
benefit their external private practice; there were few pay beds, and these 
hospitals essentially remained charities for the working class. 
The spread of American voluntary hospitals came slightly later, dif-
fusing inland from the seaboard cities under the impetus of postbellum 
urbanization and immigration (Boychuk 1999: 53 – 66; Rosenberg 1987: 
18, 100 – 115; Opdyke 1999: 19 – 27). In contrast to Britain, patients’ pay-
ments for board costs were levied from the outset, probably due to phil-
anthropic insufficiency, and this encouraged earlier middle- class utiliza-
tion. Philanthropic medical service by doctors duly declined more quickly, 
thanks to the influx of paying patients and the competitive influence of 
smaller proprietary hospitals reliant on user fees, most numerous in south-
ern and western states. From about 1900, it became the norm for doctors 
to charge for the treatment of their private patients (Starr 1982: 162 – 169; 
Stevens 1999: 20; Rosenberg 1987: 58, 256). Thus by the new century 
differences in the balance between charitable and private funding had 
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emerged in the two countries, and each would respond in slightly different 
ways to new financial challenges.
In the British voluntary hospitals, philanthropic resources came under 
strain from the late Victorian period due to staffing and infrastructure 
costs. Demand grew alongside popular faith in the hospital as a temple 
of medical science, and costs rose with the development of new technolo-
gies, whether institutional (electrification, steam heating, laundries, tele-
phone systems) or medical (laboratories, X- rays, aseptic surgical facilities) 
(Gorsky, Mohan, and Powell 2002a). In response, new modes of collec-
tion were directed at lower income groups: the Hospital Sunday funds, 
which targeted religious congregations, and the Hospital Saturday move-
ment, which amassed small donations made in the workplace. User fees 
from private patients were also instituted; by 1900 these accounted for 
some 7 percent of income and the Saturday funds for 6 percent (Cherry 
1997; Gorsky and Mohan 2006: 30). Charitable subscriptions changed 
in character and increasingly became payments from a firm or corpo-
rate body rather than the gift of a prosperous individual (Gorsky, Mohan, 
and Powell 2002b). Middle- class philanthropy was further strained after 
World War I by rising levels of personal taxation, the influenza pandemic, 
postwar price inflation, and the cumulative expense of deferred repairs. 
Government in 1918 examined the possibility of exchequer support, but 
the voluntary hospital lobby averted this, arguing that an alternative was 
for Hospital Saturday funds to be formalized into regular monthly col-
lections from employed workers (Prochaska 1992: 92 – 93; Ministry of 
Health 1921: 921). The way was now open for an expansion of the con-
tributory scheme as the lynchpin of hospital budgets. 
Figure 1 illustrates the changing structure of funding in the British 
voluntary hospitals, based on statistics reported in hospital yearbooks (for 
details of methods and underlying data, see Gorsky, Mohan, and Pow-
ell 2002a). “Charity,” which includes subscriptions, donations, legacies, 
church collections, and fund- raising events, was the original mainstay of 
income and remained dominant in 1900. This underwent a long- term pro-
portionate decline, starting with the 1914 – 1918 war and broken with only 
a brief resurgence in the early 1920s when philanthropy rose to meet the 
postwar funding crisis. The expanding “Fees/Prepayment” category is 
composed of income from mass contributory schemes and patients’ user 
fees, including charges for private wards and also typically a means- tested 
admission fee from which membership of a contributory scheme excused 
patients; in the larger hospitals the interwar ratio of scheme to fee income 
was about 75:25 (Gorsky and Mohan 2006). (It should be stressed that 
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prepayment has a different connotation in the British and U.S. cases; this 
is explored more fully below.) The “Government/Assets” category encom-
passes interest on assets — gilts, equities, property — and earnings from 
contract work, principally for local and national government (the post- 
1938 hike represents the wartime Emergency Medical Service). The major 
trend was the growth of fees and prepayment and the relative decline of 
charity, with the introduction of NHI exerting no influence on develop-
ments, because hospital coverage was excluded.
In the United States, similar cost pressures were experienced by vol-
untary hospitals in the late nineteenth century: rising demand, infrastruc-
tural improvement, medical technology, staffing, and current expenditure 
on provisions and heating (Rosenberg 1987: 238 – 244). Cyclical eco-
nomic depression also prompted diversification of funding sources and 
shunting of costs onto patients (Rosner 1982: 8 – 9, 45 – 61). In some places 
appropriations from taxation played a major role in funding the voluntary 
Figure 1 Composition of Income, British Voluntary Hospitals,  
1900–1944
Sources: Burdett’s Hospitals and Charities 1889–1923; Order of St John 1923–1928;  
Central Bureau of Hospital Information 1930–1944 
Note: There are no data for years 1920, 1928, and 1929.
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hospitals, and far more so than in Britain. Late nineteenth- century Penn-
sylvania is the locus classicus; here, in a political system rife with logroll-
ing and interest group lobbying, public funds flowed to private and sectar-
ian hospitals that promised to salve the tensions of rapid industrialization 
(Stevens 1984a, 1984b). By the early twentieth century, public subsidies 
covered more than one- fifth of voluntary hospital costs in Pennsylvania, 
Connecticut, Georgia, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia and 
also delivered substantial support in New York City and Maryland (Ste-
vens 1984b: 479). After 1910, however, such subventions began changing 
in character, from general aid to benevolent institutions meeting a public 
interest to a more specific reimbursement for care of the poor, although 
support for capital investment continued (Stevens 1982: 569, and 1984b: 
487 – 489). There was no direct parallel in the United States to the Hos-
pital Saturday Funds, although a small number of eastern hospitals bene-
fited from Hospital Saturday and Sunday Association collections (Rosner 
1982: 38 – 41). Only a few isolated prepayment schemes existed, some in 
employee groups offering cash or service benefits and others contract-
ing directly with doctors. Workers’ compensation laws then fueled both 
employer- driven schemes, notably in the railway, lumber, and mining 
industries, and also the involvement of commercial insurance companies 
that administered the program (Vogel 1980; Schwartz 1965). A tiny num-
ber of individual hospital schemes similar to the British model flourished, 
using either the sale of tickets or monthly deductions (Richardson 1945; 
Williams 1932; Schwartz 1965), but these were marginal. Instead U.S. 
hospitals addressed charitable insufficiency by extending their user fees, 
for both board and services such as X- rays (Howell 1995). 
Sources for the composition of income in U.S. voluntary hospitals seem 
more fragmentary than for Britain, but figure 2 presents some illustrative 
data. The broad categories used in figure 1 are also used here, though 
underlying these are some important distinctions. Data for 1890 are based 
solely on Eastern general hospitals, suggesting a similar balance between 
charity and other income to that in Britain, but presumably understating 
the importance of patients’ payments, which were more prominent in the 
southern and western United States (Rosner 1982; Stevens 1999). Here 
“Government/Assets” refers predominantly to interest and dividends, with 
about 16 percent from a miscellaneous category containing an uncertain 
portion of municipal government funding. “Charity” is composed of dona-
tions and legacies, and “Fees/Prepayment” is predominantly charges but 
includes 7 percent from Saturday and Sunday funds, which in the U.S. 
context might arguably be treated as charity (Rosner 1982: 38 – 41). The 
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latter years are drawn from census and American Hospital Association 
(AHA) data and are more comprehensive, though again the U.S. terminol-
ogy and reporting differs somewhat from the British. Data for 1904 refer 
to records of private nonproprietary and ecclesiastical hospitals and for the 
remaining years to records of nonprofits. In 1904 and 1935 income from 
assets is not distinguished, and here “Government” signifies tax funding. 
Likewise, in 1946 and 1955 income from charity, investments, and tax 
monies are not differentiated but are subsumed in the “Other” category. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the relative demise of charity had occurred 
earlier in the United States, and by the mid- 1930s some 70 percent of 
income came from patients through either user fees or prepayment. This 
trend continued after the war (the later sources combine tax and charity 
income) when income from patients predominated, of which insurance 
payments accounted for about half of all nongovernmental income by 
1955 (Stevens 1999).
Unlike in Britain, then, American hospital prepayment did not have 
Figure 2 Composition of Income, Selected U.S. Voluntary Hospitals, 
1890–1955
Sources: 1890: Rosner 1982: 38–41; 1904, 1935, 1946, 1955: Stevens 1999: 24, 183, 263, 
263. 
Notes: 1890 n = 11; 1904 n = 1,273; 1935 n = 2,857
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roots in the Victorian period but was instead a response to the later fund-
ing crisis of the Depression. The reasons for this relate to the different 
traditions of workplace insurance that had developed. In both countries, 
cultures of working- class association and imperatives of welfare paternal-
ism had embedded habits of collective saving for health benefits. In the 
British friendly societies, medical assessment and care were part of the 
benefit package, probably covering some 40 percent of all adult males by 
1911, so workplace subscription for hospitalization was a readily accept-
able extension (Gorsky 2006: 158). However, for the reasons noted above, 
industrial sick funds and fraternities in the United States concentrated 
solely on cash benefits. A preference for a cash benefit with which to pur-
chase medical care on the market was also the norm in trade union funds 
(Rosner and Markowitz 2003: 53 – 55). Hence it was not until later than 
in Britain that hospital coverage was instituted, but by the 1930s it had 
begun to provide a solution to the funding problems of voluntary hospitals 
in both countries, and for similar reasons.
The Nature of the Hospital  
Prepayment Schemes
Precise numbers of British contributory scheme members are uncertain 
because payments were made by workplace, not by individual enrollment. 
A widely cited estimate was 10 million by the late 1930s, and because 
most schemes included dependents’ benefits it is reasonable to estimate 
(using the conventional multiplier for private medical insurance) that 
about half the population was covered. By 1939 there were 427 schemes, 
ranging in size from 116 members to over 2 million in London’s Hos-
pital Saving Association (HSA). A small number of major urban funds 
dominated — for example, Liverpool (347,666), Leeds (250,000), and 
Birmingham (c. 650,000) (Hospitals Yearbook 1941). These were inde-
pendent bodies staffed by paid organizing secretaries with clerical support 
that distributed income across several hospitals in proportion to members’ 
utilization (Stone 1927: 220, 225; Voluntary Hospitals Commission 1923). 
In single- hospital towns the fund might exist independently, relying on 
voluntary workers and the hospital treasurer, or it might be administered 
entirely by the hospital.
The schemes collected payments predominantly through the work-
place, with volunteers organizing membership within a factory, shop, or 
office and collecting district subscription levies from the self- employed. 
Business owners collaborated by arranging payroll deductions, though 
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efforts to formalize a proportionate employers’ contribution on the model 
of NHI yielded only patchy results (National Archives n.d.; London Met-
ropolitan Archive 1939). Rates were cheap, although they varied widely 
between prosperous areas of high employment, such as Birmingham, and 
depressed regions like the northeast coalfields, where no uniform levels 
were set. Other places linked contributions to earnings on a scale of a 
“penny in the pound” of wages. Many used an income limit to exclude 
the middle class, again on the model of NHI, although some simply relied 
on good faith. Through most of England and Wales the main benefit was 
exemption from means- tested user fees on admission to a hospital. In the 
northeast and Scotland, the schemes objected to means testing and fought 
to sustain an open- door policy by which hospitals were free to all comers. 
Some larger schemes also offered benefits such as ambulance travel, home 
nursing, provision of surgical appliances (support and prosthetic items), 
and convalescence homes (Gorsky and Mohan 2006: chaps. 2 – 6).
Although the vast majority of schemes had been instigated by hospital 
managers, control and representation passed quickly to ordinary mem-
bers (Cherry 1996; Thompson 2003). Grassroots democracy became a 
key feature, with workplace committees electing delegates to manage the 
scheme and scheme representatives sitting on hospital governing boards. 
There were various models. Some major cities established hospital coun-
cils on which scheme representatives sat alongside doctors, academics, 
local politicians, and philanthropic businesspeople (Gorsky, Mohan, and 
Willis 2007). Elsewhere workers might directly elect representatives to 
a hospital board. Typically the maximum number was one- third of the 
seats, even where workers’ contributions were the dominant component 
of hospital income.
In the United States the interwar extension of hospital coverage took 
more diverse forms. Some commercial insurers writing health plans for 
employers began incorporating hospital benefits, as did employee schemes 
organized by trade unions, and a few comprehensive group plans emerged, 
such as Ross- Loos and Kaiser (Klein 2003: 128 – 131, 191 – 192, 208 – 217; 
Rosner and Markowitz 2003: 63 – 64). However, the major development 
was the growth of the prepayment schemes that became known as Blue 
Cross and that by 1945 dominated hospital insurance (Klein 2003: 205). 
Membership took off later than in Britain, in response to the Depression’s 
impact on hospital income. One forerunner was the Baylor Hospital Plan, 
started in Dallas in 1929, whose success encouraged other group plans 
covering various hospitals within a given area. Other early examples were 
in Newark (New Jersey) and Sacramento (1932), St. Paul (Minnesota) 
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and Durham (North Carolina) (1933), Cleveland (1934), and New York 
(1935) (Pink 1950). Endorsements from the philanthropic foundations, 
the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, and the American Hospital 
Association then fostered expansion elsewhere (Richardson 1945: chap. 3; 
Committee on the Costs of Medical Care 1932: 91 – 92, 132 – 133).
Payments to Blue Cross plans were made through employee payroll 
deduction, usually from 50 to 85 cents per month in the 1930s, and mem-
bership was initially pitched at both blue- and white- collar workers (the 
original Baylor plan was aimed at teachers) (Cunningham and Cunning-
ham 1997). The majority of subscribers entered through group funds, with 
about 5 percent as individuals, and there were some 100,000 volunteer 
collectors operating in workplaces (Pink 1950: 6 – 7; Richardson 1945: 
17 – 18). Service benefits were typically twenty- one days of free hospi-
tal care per year, with local variations in the provision of dependents’ 
coverage, maternity benefits, co- payments for specialist treatment, and, 
increasingly, operating rooms, X- rays, laboratory tests, drugs, dressing, 
and anesthesia (Pink 1950: 26; Richardson 1945: 56 – 57).
Table 1 shows the growth in numbers of plans and members in mid- 
century. Following small beginnings attracting largely middle- class mem-
bers, there was a surge in the late 1930s. This reflected labor’s approval of 
Blue Cross in preference to commercial carriers provided by employers, 
which it deemed too pro- management. In some places (for instance, New 
York), the bureaucratic and nonpartisan nature of Blue Cross appealed to 
labor unions fractured by ideological and ethnic division; here member-
ship growth in the early 1940s was an aspect of the collective bargaining 
process, with the city government supporting membership of municipal 
employees (Markowitz and Rosner 1991: 703 – 707). More broadly, the 
takeoff in wartime membership reflected the federal government’s and 
employers’ interventions described above, which aimed to stabilize labor 
relations (Cunningham and Cunningham 1997; Klein 2003: 177 – 190). 
Against the backdrop of the failure of the Wagner Murray Dingell bills 
and the entrenchment of health insurance as fringe benefit pursued by 
labor unions, a substantial postwar expansion occurred. This was carried 
forward by an economic boom and the political “triumph of accommoda-
tion” with the private welfare state, in which health coverage was deliv-
ered either by employer- friendly commercial carriers or the union- favored 
Blue Cross (Starr 1982: 310 – 334; Klein 2003: chap. 6).
Allowing for the time delay, hospital managers in both countries had 
devised forms of predominantly workplace- based group prepayment to 
address their funding needs. Their growth responded to the impact of 
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economic depression on hospital income: in Britain the postwar slump 
and the demise of charity as personal taxation soared; in the United States 
the Depression, which left beds unoccupied as patients struggled to pay 
bills. But were the similarities only superficial? Abel- Smith, in an early 
cross- national survey, argued that the British and U.S. prepayment funds 
were “completely different,” since Blue Cross was essentially a form of 
insurance while the schemes were not (Abel- Smith 1972: 230 – 231). In the 
United States the basis of membership was a contract among plan, mem-
ber, and hospitals for limited services at an agreed subscription (Richard-
son 1945: 51 – 57). In Britain the service was noncontractual in that hos-
pital care was not guaranteed to members and admission rights remained 
with doctors, subject to waiting lists. 
However, these differences were not as great as Abel- Smith supposed. 
British members understood that they had an “implied bargain” and that 
while contributors had no legal right to treatment, they did “possess a 
strong moral right” (Ministry of Health 1921: 7; The Hospital 1931: 211). 
There were various reasons why a pure insurance model was not adopted 
in Britain. Depicting subscriptions as voluntary gifts ensured charitable 
status with ramifications for tax liability; it also reduced the risks of alien-
ating philanthropists or prompting honorary consultants to claim fees. A 
contractual obligation to provide treatment would also challenge medical 
authority over admissions and the lay administrators’ control of hospital 
capacity (Gorsky and Mohan 2006: 108). It is worth noting that early 
Blue Cross did not aspire to strictly function as insurance but rather to 
Table 1 Numbers and Membership of U.S. Blue Cross Plans, 1933–1951
Year Plans Members
1933  6 11,500
1934 10 55,000
1935 17 215,000
1937 26 608,000
1938 38 1.4 million
1939  2.8 million
1940  4.4 million
1945  15.7 million
1947 81 24.2 million
1948  30 million
1951  40.9 million
Source: Compiled from Cunningham and Cunningham 1997: 19, 28, 32, 58, 97
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improve access (Padgug 1991: 798). The Baylor scheme made no actuarial 
attempt to record costs and length of stay, the hospital’s attitude being that 
“it was more money than they had before, so what the hell” (Cunning-
ham and Cunningham 1997: 11). And in New York there was no explicit 
linkage between levels of reimbursement and actual costs, because there 
was no uniform hospital accounting method (Fox 1991: 730). Conversely, 
although the British schemes did not follow insurance principles, their 
leaders frequently exhorted members to subscribe at a level that would 
approximate the actual costs of care (Gorsky and Mohan 2006: 85, 129).
More clear- cut differences related to benefits and social constituency. 
While British members expected to receive both full maintenance and 
medical care, Blue Cross benefits specified only accommodation and an 
agreed range of technical provisions. The prior commercialization of in- 
patient medical care in the United States had long established the principle 
of separate charges for doctor’s services, which the AMA’s fierce opposi-
tion to comprehensive group plans with salaried physicians had protected 
(Klein 2003: 130 – 131, 155 – 156, 196). Meanwhile in Britain the swift 
transition from philanthropic to contributory funding and the relative 
insignificance of direct fees and charges meant that the long- established 
culture of free care was not significantly affected. Blue Cross plans also 
offered differing rates for private or semiprivate rooms and the less desir-
able general wards, with most members using the former (Pink 1950: 
11 – 12; Richardson 1945: 70). This preference reflects the middle- class 
character of first- wave Blue Cross subscribers: according to survey data, 
in 1940 only about 34 percent were blue- collar workers (Richardson 1945: 
79). Although promotional material shows that the British schemes had 
some petit bourgeois appeal, here the changing social gradient of member-
ship ran in a different direction to Blue Cross, with several inaugurating 
“provident” plans pitched at the middle class (some of which amalgam-
ated after 1948 to develop into the British United Provident Association, 
one of Britain’s leading private medical insurers) (Bryant 1968: 17, 21).
That said, contemporaries saw clear similarities between Blue Cross 
and the contributory schemes (Dodd 1948: 4). Indeed, British officials 
claimed that their model had influenced the United States — for example, 
in the Duke Endowment’s studies of the British HSA, which informed the 
North Carolina plan, and transatlantic visits by Frank van Dyk of New 
York’s Associated Hospital Services (Richardson 1945: 24 – 25; Inter-
national Co- operation 1938; Contributory Schemes 1939). At the outset 
both placed a premium on equity by community rating of premiums, 
and only later (noticeably by the 1970s) was Blue Cross compelled to 
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move toward experience rating, following competition from private insur-
ers (Marmor 1991). Both encouraged the integration of services through 
reciprocal agreements made between funds and groups of hospitals to 
permit patient choice. In New York, for example, Blue Cross disburse-
ment practices shaped the balance between different types of accommo-
dation and was also involved in planning committees; similarly, British 
schemes promoted contracting between the municipal and voluntary sec-
tors and had seats on joint hospital councils active in major cities (Fox 
1991; Gorsky and Mohan 2006: 80 – 87, 93 – 95). Integration was also fur-
thered by national representative bodies, with the Hospital Service Plan 
Commission of the American Hospital Association encouraging common 
standards and the British Hospital Contributory Schemes Association 
(BHCSA) set up in 1930 to deal with issues such as reciprocal benefits 
between neighboring schemes.
Finally, both were nonprofit organizations that presented themselves as 
a community- based bridge between citizen and hospital. Organizationally 
both drew on local and voluntary support: in the United States the church, 
Boy Scouts, farm bureaus, and chambers of commerce assisted with mem-
bership drives, while in Britain thousands of volunteer collectors and 
hospital fundraisers were used (Cunningham and Cunningham 1997: 15, 
69 – 70; Pink 1950: 8). As noted, this status was recognized in respect 
of fiscal obligations, with Blue Cross exempt from federal income tax as 
a social welfare organization (Richardson 1945: 37). Both represented 
themselves as distinct from commercial insurance: the British deployed 
the language and imagery of philanthropy and service, and the Ameri-
cans stressed their role as public- spirited noncommercial bodies, with 
the Blue Cross symbol, widely adopted in advertising drives from 1934, 
evoking the charitable Red Cross (Gorsky and Mohan 2006: 106 – 114; 
Cunningham and Cunningham 1997: 14; Brown 1991; Rothman 1991). 
These voluntarist identities meant that despite the organizations’ being 
initiated mainly by hospital managers, participants in both countries laid 
claim to representation on governing boards (Gorsky and Mohan 2006: 
32, 35, 93 – 99; Cunningham and Cunningham 1997: 28 – 29; Markowitz 
and Rosner 1991: 704). The British schemes evolved elaborate electoral 
procedures connecting workplace contributors to hospital management 
committees. Minority representation limited real decision- making author-
ity, but sometimes worker influence was genuine — for example, in setting 
subscription levels and preventing the introduction of local means testing 
(Gorsky and Mohan 2006: 124 – 139). In the United States worker repre-
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sentation was less extensive, to the chagrin of the unions; despite its com-
munity image, Blue Cross remained essentially a provider interest (Starr 
1982: 308 – 309; Markowitz and Rosner 1991: 709 – 713).
Nonetheless, at the rhetorical level fund leaders in both Britain and 
the United States appealed to a spirit of self- help and active citizenship. 
According to its director, the New York plan strengthened “the moral char-
acter and the fibre of the community by making people self- sustaining, 
rather than expecting charitable support or some subsidy” International 
Co- operation 1938: 22). The London HSA similarly depicted membership 
as personal respectability, civic responsibility, and patriarchal duty (Gor-
sky and Mohan 2006: 109 – 112). This self- representation shifted during 
the early 1940s in the face of health reform proposals. In the United States 
prepayment advocates yoked the benefits of voluntarism to antistatism 
inflected with patriotism (Brown 1991: 658 – 659). Now Blue Cross’s lead-
ers claimed that it embodied the “American spirit of neighborliness and 
self- help”; it was “a distinctively American institution, a unique combi-
nation of individual initiative and social responsibility” (Rothman 1991: 
681). In C. Rufus Rorem’s words, “Governments tend to emphasize equity 
not efficiency; certainty not originality . . . experiment or innovation” 
(Cunningham and Cunningham 1997: 19). Likewise, scheme leaders in 
Britain evoked “that sturdy spirit of self- help which has had so much to do 
with the formation of British character,” whereas state welfare would sap 
“individual enterprise and independence” (Merseyside Hospitals Council 
1944: 11, 13). Here too the “initiative and effort” of the voluntary sector 
was extolled. It could “experiment in ways that statutory authorities can 
never do. . . . In the ‘totalitarian state’ this might not be so” (Editorial 
1936: 3, 2). 
Despite their obvious differences, by the 1940s both Blue Cross and the 
contributory schemes championed nonprofit prepayment within a liberal 
model of the hospital service. It was a model based on neither state nor 
market in which ideas about civil society legitimated a strong voluntary 
sector and in which government’s role was limited to covering the depen-
dent poor. It was premised explicitly on the notion that access to the volun-
tary hospital was determined by individual effort and self- reliance, albeit 
expressed through association with group prepayment funds. It was thus 
clearly distinct from a social democratic model, which treated health care 
as a right of citizenship and was shortly to be installed in Britain.
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The Critical Juncture: Prepayment and 
Health Care Reform in the 1930s and 1940s
As noted, when policy debate began British civil servants explored the 
possibility of using the schemes to finance nonmedical hospital costs, with 
the remainder coming from public funds (Honigsbaum 1989: 157 – 160). 
Indeed, Sir John Maude, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Health 
until 1945, initially lauded the schemes as the “sheet anchor” of the hos-
pital system, believing they could be retained if only they could achieve 
regional uniformity so that benefits were standardized across hospitals 
(National Archives 1942). However, more junior civil servants gradu-
ally concluded that diversity and uneven distribution meant the schemes 
were poorly suited to meet the goals of universal, comprehensive cover-
age, while the additional transaction costs seemed burdensome (National 
Archives 1941). There was also a strain of opinion among policy mak-
ers holding that widespread participation in prepayment schemes did not 
necessarily indicate deep- seated attachment to the voluntary system but 
was simply a pragmatic choice (Beveridge 1942: 160; National Archives 
1942). In this view the main achievement of the schemes was to prepare 
public opinion for further institutionalization of collective hospital pay-
ment through tax or NHI. These assumptions underpinned proposals in 
a 1944 NHS White Paper to substitute voluntary contribution by statu-
tory funding (Honigsbaum 1989: 161 – 164; Webster 1988: 53 – 54). This 
decision would be critical to the shaping of the NHS; once the hospitals 
were predominantly reliant on public monies, the case for public control 
became more persuasive. Why, then, did such views prevail?
At this point it is helpful to return to the theoretical perspectives of 
comparative health systems history. First, what can the institutionalist 
approach reveal? Given that the crucial decision was taken by the coali-
tion cabinet during 1943 – 1944, the familiar emphasis on deep change 
as the outcome of Labour’s 1945 electoral majority cannot apply here, 
although Bevan would later be unsympathetic to the schemes (House of 
Commons Debates 1946: col. 47). More telling is historical institutional-
ism’s interest in the state as principal actor, since it was the bureaucrats of 
the Ministry of Health who developed the case against the schemes’ place 
in the planned NHS. Path dependence and the feedback loops of processes 
set in motion by earlier reforms can illuminate their positions. Once NHI 
was established in 1911, a parallel unregulated system insuring a differ-
ent aspect of health care was always bound to attract criticism as less 
equitable and rational; a view arose of the schemes as a temporary stop-
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gap filling a space that government ought ultimately to occupy (Political 
and Economic Planning 1937: 227, 237, 399, 410 – 411; Beveridge 1948: 
115 – 116). Arguably the very act of establishing a Ministry of Health in 
1918 had created a bureaucratic momentum toward a larger state role, and 
although interwar resource constraints initially stalled progress the ambi-
tion was ingrained in departmental culture, awaiting only the opportunity 
(Webster 1990: 140 – 141).
Is this explanation adequate? Returning now to the United States, recall 
the importance of the institutionalist analysis in explaining Roosevelt’s 
and Truman’s inability to establish NHI: the polity tended to impede radi-
cal change through the absence of party unity and multiple veto points 
open to hostile stakeholders. However, pluralist theory also suggests that 
alongside this must be set the changing positions and relative power of 
the pressure groups seeking to exercise such vetoes. Blue Cross interests 
during this period were closely allied to those of the hospital lobby, the 
AHA, whose Committee on Hospital Service advised the funds and fos-
tered common standards (Stevens 1999: 186 – 193; Starr 1982: 295 – 298). 
The AHA had emerged as a significant pressure group during the New 
Deal, sustained by a cadre of hospital administrators with a strong pro-
fessional identity grounded in the private sector. Its lobbying techniques 
were already well honed in debates over issues such as accessing fed-
eral grants and securing exemption from Social Security legislation (Ste-
vens 1999: 156 – 170). Having initially considered the idea of Blue Cross 
becoming the mandatory carrier for a statutory health insurance scheme, 
the AHA became hostile following the 1939 Wagner Bill (Boychuk 1999: 
127 – 130), which proposed publicly administered hospital insurance, rais-
ing AHA fears of government intrusion. Subsequent proposals for national 
hospital insurance in the 1940s were opposed by the voluntary hospitals 
and Blue Cross, both directly in the policy arena and by molding opinion 
through publicity that normalized the notion of voluntary insurance as an 
appropriate model for health security (Rothman 1991: 689 – 690). Instead 
the AHA directed its efforts to lobbying for federal support of capital 
programs, playing a central role in the broad coalition that led to the Hill- 
Burton Act (Fox 1986: 117 – 131; Stevens 1999: 212). 
Blue Cross was also a beneficiary of the sophisticated and vituperative 
campaign against national health insurance waged by the AMA, which 
along with commercial insurers ensured that Republicans and Southern 
Democrats blocked its passage (Gordon 2003: 220 – 224; Funigiello 2005: 
38 – 87). Doctors had initially been hostile to prepayment funds, seen as 
the harbinger of group practice that would reduce the physician to the 
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status of employee. However, as medical incomes plummeted during 
the Depression, the AMA gradually acknowledged the virtue of plans 
that covered hospital costs but not medical fees (Starr 1982: 299 – 300). 
Beginning in 1938 state medical societies were signaling approval, and 
the AMA officially endorsed group hospitalization in 1942 (Richardson 
1945: 83 – 86). Thus doctors came to embrace Blue Cross as a bulwark 
against something worse: extensive statutory insurance covering medical 
and hospital services.
The U.S. case therefore directs attention to the interest group arena 
and to the common cause that voluntary insurance was able to make with 
the more powerful lobbies of hospital leadership and organized medicine. 
How do these insights translate to Britain? In fact, the British polity also 
offered considerable scope for bargaining between interested parties and 
for the schemes’ case to be heard, in both the agenda- setting and policy 
development phases. Beveridge took detailed evidence before producing 
his report, civil servants consulted extensively prior to the white paper, 
and parliamentary debates were held both before and after its appearance. 
Indeed, the hallmark of policy making before 1945 was the coalition gov-
ernment’s desire to construct a service that would satisfy all the interested 
parties, and it was its inability to find a formula agreeable to the BMA, 
the voluntary hospital leadership, and local government that stalled legis-
lation (Webster 2002: 10 – 12). Yet the contributory schemes have barely 
figured in pressure group readings of the NHS debates (Willcocks 1967; 
Eckstein 1964). This is puzzling. The schemes’ membership was vast and 
their representative association, the BHCSA, articulated powerful argu-
ments for their survival. These included the claim that the schemes under-
pinned active citizenship in the welfare state, provided a channel for local 
participation in health services, and ensured that money would “follow 
the patient” in an efficient fashion (Gorsky, Mohan, and Willis 2005). 
However, the record shows that these arguments were sidelined in policy 
debates, both within the Ministry of Health and in Parliament. 
This is because in contrast to Blue Cross, the BHCSA was unable to 
ally itself with other key actors to defend voluntary financing alongside 
clinician autonomy and institutional independence. Relations had always 
been cool with the BMA, which worried that the schemes siphoned away 
potential paying patients, and no prior agreement had developed. More-
over, the BMA was itself divided, and although its leadership was wary 
of the NHS proposals, many voluntary hospital doctors were attracted 
to the promise of more stable funding and reward. To them, finance was 
less important than administrative structure, particularly the avoidance 
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of municipal control, which threatened to reduce their status to local gov-
ernment employees. The BMA’s negotiating goal with respect to hospi-
tals was therefore to secure the establishment of a new tier of regional 
management bodies rather than to preserve voluntary modes of finance 
(Webster 1988: 47 – 49, 60 – 61). 
The schemes’ other potential allies were the hospital leaders, but the 
British Hospital Association (BHA) was a weak pressure group. Unlike 
its U.S. counterpart, it was unversed in political maneuvering and failed to 
articulate forcefully an alternative funding model. Hospital managers had 
an ambivalent relationship with the scheme leadership. On the one hand 
they were reliant on their financial support, but on the other they some-
times clashed with worker representatives on hospital governing boards, 
many of whom were prominent local labor organizers. Nor had the two 
parties cooperated effectively previously. From the late 1930s the BHA, 
aligned with the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust (a foundation begun 
by an automobile magnate), had sought to head off talk of state direc-
tion of hospitals by proposing its own model. This was a regionalization 
scheme focused on the voluntary teaching hospitals and medical schools 
and incorporating the merger and standardization of all the contributory 
schemes within each region, to achieve uniform benefits and interhospital 
reciprocity. However, the schemes’ local and parochial sentiments made 
them unwilling to surrender their sovereignty, and BHA proposals for an 
NHS led by the third sector foundered. Therefore, once ministry doubts 
about voluntary financing surfaced in 1943, the BHA quickly abandoned 
the schemes and, like the BMA, focused on preserving the hospitals’ inde-
pendence from municipal politicians (Gorsky, Mohan, and Willis 2005).
Political pluralism within a historical institutionalist framework thus 
provides a partial explanation, but it does not resolve the question of why 
the BHCSA proved so feeble. With its vast membership and close relation-
ship at the local level with organized labor, why could it not exert more 
influence? In thinking about the relationship between mass participation 
in voluntary insurance plans and political choices, we now return to the 
United States. Here the position adopted by labor was significant in the 
shaping of the health system, though as much for what it could not achieve 
as for what it could. 
As noted, labor had not thrown its weight behind Progressive NHI 
proposals in the 1910s, arguing that they detracted from the greater goal 
of the living wage and undermined the attraction of union membership 
(Derickson 2005: 7 – 8, 12 – 13). However, by the mid- 1930s both the AFL 
and some unions within the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) 
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were moving toward support for NHI (Rosner and Markowitz 2003: 62; 
Gordon 2003: 55). The New Deal era was one of experimentation, when 
labor- led community health centers as well as publicly funded clinics and 
Blue Cross seemed to augur alternative models of group practice plans 
that NHI might ultimately underwrite. Echoing British perceptions, union 
representatives believed they were “blazing the path” that the state would 
soon follow (Klein 2003: 131 – 160, at 153). Crucially, though, the succes-
sive defeats of NHI proposals forced a pragmatic reorientation, with both 
the AFL and the CIO increasingly concentrating on maximizing labor 
rather than employer control over local arrangements — in some respects 
a reversion to an earlier struggle to assert workers’ rights against welfare 
paternalism (Stevens 1988: 135 – 137).
Then came the wartime surge in voluntary insurance membership. 
Labor’s gains in this area further directed its health policy away from 
NHI and public sector provision in favor of security negotiated within 
the employment contract (Klein 2003: 182). Within this context the long- 
standing AFL suspicion of statutory health insurance as a threat to orga-
nizational strength reemerged; AFL and CIO policy instead emphasized 
improving representation on Blue Cross boards (Rosner and Markowitz 
2003: 62 – 66; Markowitz and Rosner 1991: 699 – 701; Gordon 2003: 
57 – 67). The labor unions’ resignation to the futility of pursuing health 
rights in the political arena also testifies to their notoriously “barren mar-
riage” with the Democratic Party, which vacillated over NHI both during 
the New Deal and in the 1940s, believing that full employment would 
solve social welfare questions (Gordon 2003: 276 – 277). Truman’s sup-
port for universal coverage from 1945, even assuming it was not purely for 
electoral advantage, came when labor was growing ever more committed 
to employment- based benefits. An alternative social democratic route to 
hospital insurance was therefore not broadly articulated by the U.S. work-
ing class.
In Britain, too, labor’s importance lay in what it did not do, though 
here the outcome was very different than in the United States. The earlier 
arrival of statutory social insurance had meant there was no analog of the 
U.S. unions’ struggle for insurance as contractual benefit. Nationally, two 
broad strategies toward health policy emerged after 1911, with the trade 
union movement supporting the extension of coverage under NHI and the 
Labour Party favoring the expansion of a municipal health provision (Ear-
wicker 1982: 11 – 12, 106 – 107, 152, 176 – 183). Locally, however, there 
were indications that labor could accommodate itself to a system of inde-
pendent voluntary hospitals sustained by contributory schemes (Doyle 
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2007, 2010). These were replete with dignitaries from trade unions, trade 
councils, cooperatives, and friendly societies whose involvement signified 
both a commitment to civic action and more practical concerns with the 
level of payroll deductions and the employment rights of hospital work-
ers (Gorsky and Mohan 2006: 101 – 105, 114 – 116). Governing rights on 
hospital management boards were also highly valued, such that their later 
removal under the NHS was to be a great source of rancor (Webster 1988: 
277 – 279). Why then could the BHCSA not muster sufficient support from 
its constituents in the labor movement to strengthen its hand as a pressure 
group?
The answer is that despite their apparent accommodation with the 
voluntary hospitals, many working- class contributors looked forward to 
“state organised and subsidised hospital services” (League of Subscrib-
ers 1947). This aspect of labor’s role has gone unnoticed, both because 
it expressed itself as diffidence — what was not done — and because evi-
dence lies buried in contributory scheme records. Active support for a 
public hospital system was particularly prominent in cities where socialist 
ideology was more intense, such as Leeds and Liverpool (Doyle 2010; 
Gorsky and Mohan 2006: 115). Thus the BHCSA’s efforts to mount a 
defense of the movement following the white paper were compromised 
from within as “Labour men” refused to lend support (Gorsky, Mohan, 
and Willis 2005: 186). In contrast to the U.S. situation, the unions had 
no investment in the schemes as a source of organizational strength, and 
there were good reasons why the new proposals looked more attractive. 
Financing hospital care through local or national taxation or NHI was 
more progressive in that it redistributed costs equitably and systematized 
employer contributions. 
As a pressure group, the BHCSA was not only disadvantaged by its lack 
of external allies. It was also internally disabled by bands of its own mem-
bership who were either apathetic or hostile to its survival. Indeed, BHCSA 
pessimism was expressed as early as 1935: “The main supporters of the 
Contributory system . . . are wage- earners and . . . Trade Unionists . . . 
identified with the Labour Party. The Socialist party was bound to sup-
port . . . a State Service, and sooner or later, the voluntary hospitals would 
come under State control” (BHCSA Conference Report 1935). 
Conclusions
In concluding his study of the origins of private social insurance in the 
United States, Frank Dobbin (1992: 1419) made a plea for the synthesis 
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of institutionalist and pluralist approaches to welfare state history. His 
argument was that processes of state formation were of obvious impor-
tance to the United States’ distinctive trajectory, in that the lack of federal 
bureaucratic capacity made an early move to NHI unlikely. However, the 
feedback loops established by early policy choices also mattered because 
they refashioned the positions adopted by the different interest groups, 
notably employers and labor unions. Thus “group behavior” becomes “an 
intermediate variable between institutional context and organizational and 
political choices” (Dobbin 1992: 1420). The present discussion echoes this 
call for synthesis from the perspective of the British case. 
I began by setting out the problem of reconciling new British find-
ings about the pre- NHS hospital with existing accounts of health system 
change. The argument was that mass contributory schemes in the interwar 
period both consolidated the hospitals’ funding base and opened up new 
possibilities for system integration and community control, while appar-
ently sustaining a voluntary ethic of responsible citizenship. This history 
weakens the claim that a dominant technocratic consensus in favor of 
reform emerged during the 1930s, with only the fine detail to be deter-
mined. Instead a mixed economy of funding and provision might have 
been secured, which suited key interests: the doctors, with their aversion 
to becoming public employees, and the voluntary hospital leaders seeking 
to preserve independence. Our understanding of the coming of the NHS is 
therefore incomplete without examination of why this model was rejected. 
I further argued that this history bore various similarities to developments 
in the United States. Both countries maintained two- tier hospital systems 
through the interwar period in which the public sector was associated 
with dependence and stigma and the voluntary sector with self- reliance 
and local autonomy. Both transformed their funding structures as charity 
became inadequate in favor of user fees and prepayment schemes; like the 
schemes, Blue Cross furthered regional integration and promoted volun-
tary effort. It therefore seems appropriate to apply to Britain the analyti-
cal approach developed in the United States by scholars such as Dobbin, 
Jennifer Klein, and Colin Gordon. 
The resulting discussion endorsed elements of the historical institu-
tionalist position, though in a nuanced way. Just as Hacker argued, the 
earlier adoption of NHI, with the limited 1911 benefit package, was criti-
cal in establishing a path- dependent process. The supplementary form 
of hospital cover that rose to fill the gap suffered from an unfavorable 
policy feedback, in that voluntary contribution was always likely to appear 
inconvenient and inequitable by comparison with statutory insurance. Pol-
Gorsky ■ Hospitals, Finance, and Health System Reform  397 
icy makers with an open mind toward a larger state role were therefore 
inclined to interpret the schemes not as a viable alternative but simply as 
evidence for mass acquiescence toward formalized hospital funding. 
However, this in itself did not make the transition from NHI to NHS 
inevitable. The demise of the contributory schemes was sealed well before 
the Labour Party’s electoral majority brought the full weight of central-
ized political power to bear on health system reform. Instead their rejec-
tion occurred in late 1943, in the midst of a period of negotiation among 
stakeholders during an unusual interlude of coalition politics in Britain. 
Furthermore, the contributory schemes initially had some sympathizers 
within the bureaucracy and had several opportunities to make their case 
in the political arena. The analysis therefore turned to the role of pressure 
group politics, which has been so prominent in the U.S. historiography. In 
contrast to Blue Cross, which aligned with the hospital and medical lead-
ership in opposition to NHI, the British schemes remained tactically and 
temperamentally distant from these lobbies. Their representatives were 
therefore isolated and weak during the open, consensus- seeking phase of 
policy making between 1941 and 1945. 
The U.S. literature also emphasizes the changing relationship between 
labor and business in shaping the United States’ public- private welfare 
state. The absence of a social democratic party advancing a health plat-
form, and the inability of reformers to carry NHI in the 1910s and 1930s, 
drove U.S. workers to seek health security as a right of employment, not 
of citizenship. This too can inform the British case. Although recent work 
cautions against assuming a homogenous labor position, here the political 
circumstances allowed labor to influence outcomes very differently. For 
many leftists within the contributory scheme movement, participation was 
a temporary phase in the march toward the collectivized services envis-
aged by the Labour Party. Thus the rhetoric of the voluntary ideal propa-
gated by scheme and hospital leaders was not uniformly supported by a 
mass membership, whose diffidence or opposition fatally inhibited the 
ability to mobilize as a pressure group. Here was a reason for the “public 
preferences and socially shared understandings” in favor of open access 
and public ownership of hospitals that pollsters picked up in 1943 – 1944, 
at least from some sections of the population (Jacobs 1992: 207). This 
hardly amounts to a positive restatement of the labor mobilization thesis 
as the principal determinant of health system change. But it does reaffirm 
the importance of labor’s position in the balance of forces that brought 
about the British NHS in 1948.
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